Abstract. In this paper we present the design and implementation of a Pluggable Fault-Tolerant CORBA Infrastructure that provides fault tolerance for CORBA applications by utilizing the pluggable protocols framework that most CORBA ORBs provide. Our approach does not require any modification to the CORBA ORB, and requires only minimal modification to the application. Moreover, it avoids the difficulty of retrieving and assigning the ORB state by embedding the fault tolerance mechanisms into the ORB. The Pluggable Fault-Tolerant CORBA Infrastructure exhibits similar or better performance than other Fault-Tolerant CORBA systems, while providing strong replica consistency.
Introduction
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [15] , specified by the Object Management Group (OMG), is one of the most popular architectures for distributed computing. Several different approaches have been developed to provide fault tolerance for distributed applications based on the CORBA standard. Early research efforts to enhance CORBA with fault tolerance took an integration approach, with the fault tolerance mechanisms implemented inside the ORB [4] . That approach requires extensive modification to both the ORB core and to the applications and, therefore, is regarded as an intrusive approach. Later research efforts adopted a non-intrusive approach that is either service-based with fault tolerance provided through service objects above the ORB [3, 7, 13] , or interception-based with fault tolerance mechanisms implemented underneath the ORB (in a different address space) [9, 10, 12] .
In 1998 the Object Management Group (OMG) issued an RFP for Fault-Tolerant CORBA (FT CORBA) with the aim of standardizing those efforts. The specification of FT CORBA was finalized in March 2000 [14] . FT CORBA defines a set of service interfaces and mechanisms that provide fault tolerance for CORBA-based applications through object replication, fault detection and notification, and logging and recovery. The FT CORBA standard mandates strong replica consistency for the replicated application objects.
To maintain strong replica consistency, some degree of integration of the fault tolerance mechanisms with the CORBA ORB is necessary to retrieve and assign the ORB state during recovery of a replica or during the transfer of state from a primary replica to the backup replicas [9, 10, 12] . We have investigated a new approach [21] that embeds the fault tolerance mechanisms into the ORB, while providing maximum transparency to both the ORB and the applications. It uses the pluggable protocols framework [6] that most modern CORBA ORBs provide.
The Pluggable Protocols Framework (PPF) separates the messaging and network protocols from other parts of the ORB core and from the application objects. The PPF allows the network protocol to be replaced, and also allows the messaging protocol to be replaced. Thus, the PPF makes it possible to develop CORBA applications for, and to deploy them in, environments for which the standard GIOP/IIOP protocol is not appropriate [6] . The PPF also provides CORBA applications with improved quality of service by enabling the use of customized protocols that are tailored to those applications and their environments.
In this paper we present the design and implementation of a FT CORBA compliant infrastructure, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure, that is based on the PPF and that replaces only the network protocol and not the messaging protocol. The Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure achieves performance similar to, or better than, existing FT CORBA systems [13, 23] , while providing strong replica consistency and supporting a wider range of applications.
Background

The pluggable protocols framework
Many CORBA ORBs now provide a pluggable protocols framework (PPF), for example, Orbix 2000 from Iona, ORBacus from Object Oriented Concepts/Iona, VisiBroker (realtime version) from Highlander Engineering/Borland, ORBExpress from Objective Interface Systems, TAO from Washington University, St. Louis, and e * ORB from Vertel, just to name a few. Although the PPFs differ slightly from one ORB to another, most of them are based on similar reactor-based design patterns [18] .
The PPF provides a set of abstract base classes for the ORB-level transport interfaces (e.g., the ORBacus PPF pro- vides Connector Factory, Connector, Transport, Acceptor Factory and Acceptor interfaces). The protocol plug-in must inherit from those classes in order to provide a concrete implementation for a specific protocol. The PPF provides concrete classes for the Factory Registry interfaces. Concrete implementations of the Factory classes register with the corresponding Factory Registries in order to be loaded into the ORB runtime.
Fault-Tolerant CORBA
The Fault-Tolerant (FT) CORBA standard defines interfaces and mechanisms for object replication, fault detection and notification, and logging and recovery.
The Replication Manager defined by the FT CORBA standard handles the creation, deletion and replication of application objects. Although each replica of an object has an individual object reference, the Replication Manager fabricates an Interoperable Object Group Reference (IOGR) for the replicated server object (object group) that clients use to contact that replicated server. The IOGR contains a profile for each of the replicas in the server object group. The Replication Manager inherits a number of interfaces for the management of replicas and replica groups and also for the management of fault tolerance properties.
The FT CORBA standard also specifies the mechanisms and interfaces for hierarchical monitoring at the object, type and/or location (e.g., host) level. To enable the recovery of an object replica that has failed, the FT CORBA standard defines the FT::Checkpointable and FT::Updateable interfaces. The FT::Checkpointable interface contains the get_state() and set_state methods that allow an object's state to be retrieved from an existing replica and assigned to a new or recovering replica. The FT::Updateable interface contains the get_update() and set_ update() methods that allow an object's state to be retrieved and assigned incrementally.
Overview of the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure
The Pluggable Fault-Tolerant CORBA Infrastructure (PluggableFT) is illustrated in figure 1 . On the server-side, fault tolerance is provided by the fault-tolerant (FT) protocol plugin, the Totem group communication system [8] , the Replication Manager, the Fault Notifier and the Fault Detectors. The Replication Manager and the Fault Notifier are implemented as CORBA objects running as separate processes, and are replicated using the active replication style. The Fault Detector that detects faults at the object level is implemented as a component of the FT protocol plug-in.
The Totem group communication system [8] uses a rotating token around a logical ring to provide reliable totallyordered delivery of multicast messages. Totem also serves as a process-level and host-level fault detector. When it detects a fault, Totem delivers a fault report to the Fault Notifier. Totem also conveys fault reports generated by the object-level fault detector to the Fault Notifier.
Unreplicated clients connect to the replicated servers through passively replicated gateways that provide access into the fault tolerance domain that contains the replicated servers. The client-side failover mechanisms specified by the FT CORBA standard are implemented as a protocol plug-in.
PluggableFT supports active replication (where all replicas perform processing and compete for sending), semi-active replication (where all replicas perform processing but only one is allowed to send) and passive replication (only the primary replica performs processing and sending). With semiactive replication, there are no duplicate messages and, thus, duplicate messages do not need to be detected and suppressed. Recovery is slightly slower than recovery under active replication, but is faster than recovery under passive replication.
Server-side FT protocol plug-in
The server-side fault-tolerant (FT) protocol is plugged into the ORB using the pluggable protocols framework. As shown in figure 2 , the server-side FT protocol plug-in consists of the following components: FT Adaptor, Duplicate Filter, Recovery Manager, Property Manager, State Manager, Operation Scheduler, and FT ORB Transport.
FT Adaptor
The FT Adaptor handles the connection to Totem, passes incoming messages to the Duplicate Filter, and routes outgoing messages to Totem. Currently, a Unix socket is used to connect the FT Adaptor and Totem.
The FT Adaptor attaches a FT protocol header to all messages. Totem uses the FT protocol header information to demultiplex the messages that are received and to deliver them to the correct FT Adaptor. The FT protocol header also contains information that is needed to detect and suppress duplicate invocations and responses, as explained later.
The FT Adaptor sends and receives two different types of messages: (1) the GIOP messages that the CORBA objects use, and (2) the control messages that the FT Adaptor uses. An example of such a control message is the disconnection indication message that the FT Adaptor sends, when the ORB destroys the Transport instance, to ensure that the peer Transport instance is shutdown and garbage collected.
FT ORB Transport
The FT ORB Transport component implements the mandatory interfaces specified by the PPF for each ORB. For ORBacus, it includes the implementation of the Connector Factory, Connector, Transport, Acceptor Factory and Acceptor interfaces. The GIOP messaging protocol is retained, and the transport protocol is changed. Instead of using TCP/IP, all of the transport instances share the same connection from the FT Adaptor to Totem. Synchronization mechanisms are built into the component based on the pthread library interfaces.
The instances of the concrete classes in the FT ORB Transport component, such as the Connector, Transport and Acceptor, are owned by the ORB runtime. The Transport instances may be created either directly by the ORB runtime or by the FT protocol during the setting of the ORBlevel state, and they are subsequently handed over to the ORB runtime. The FT Adaptor registers callbacks with these Transport instances to receive notification of the creation and deletion events. For these creation and deletion events, the FT Adaptor sends connection and disconnection indication control messages so that appropriate actions can be taken by the FT protocol plug-in.
Each Transport instance has a definite role as a client or a server during its lifetime. A client Transport instance is used by a Connector instance to send request messages to a remote server and to receive the corresponding reply messages. A server Transport instance is used by an Acceptor instance to receive request messages from a remote client and to send the corresponding reply messages.
Each Transport instance is assigned a unique transport id that consists of a 4-tuple (source group id, destination group id, connection sequence number, role) by the FT protocol. The first two identifiers indicate the identities of the sending and receiving groups, respectively. The connection sequence number n, which is determined by the client process that initiates the connection, indicates that this Transport instance is created for the nth connection requested by this client. The Transport instance on the server-side that is created upon a connection request from a client uses the same connection sequence number as that used by the corresponding Transport instance on the client-side. An example of the connection setup in PluggableFT is shown in figure 3 .
Duplicate Filter
The Duplicate Filter detects and suppresses duplicate messages at both sending and receiving sides, and passes only non-duplicate messages to the Recovery Manager. For the purpose of duplicate detection, each Transport instance contains a message filter id, which counts the number of messages sent through a connection. In the FT protocol, duplicate incoming messages can occur only if they arrive for the same transport instance (identified by the transport id). The Duplicate Filter stores the transport ids that it has seen, and also the last message filter id for each transport id (this suffices because the message filter id increases monotonically). The Duplicate Filter checks the transport id and the message filter id in the message header against its record. A message is deemed to be a duplicate if the Duplicate Filter finds a record with the same transport id but with a higher (or identical) message filter id. The Duplicate Filter drops a duplicate message once it has detected that the message is a duplicate. For outgoing message duplicate detection, the PluggableFT uses a sophisticated two-tier duplicate filtering mechanisms. A detailed description of the mechanisms is given in section 5.1. 
Recovery Manager
The Recovery Manager implements the Logging and Recovery Mechanisms. The log used by the Recovery Manager is formed by two message queues, one for request messages and the other for reply messages. Non-duplicate request messages are stored in a total order in the request queue, and non-duplicate reply messages are stored in a total order in the reply queue. The log is used to guarantee the local single thread of control in order to achieve strong consistency among the replicas, and it is also used for recovery. Two separate message queues are used rather than only one. If only one queue were used, the request and reply messages would be interleaved and a linear search would be required to find and deliver a request or reply message to the ORB Transport. By using two separate message queues, one for requests and one for replies, the Operation Scheduler retrieves a message from the top of each queue and delivers it to the ORB Transport.
During recovery, the Recovery Manager retrieves both the application-level state and the ORB-level state from the State Manager, fabricates a single message that contains both kinds of state, and multicasts the message using Totem. The Recovery Manager at a backup replica (for passive replication) or a newly started replica (for passive, active or semi-active replication) forwards the aggregate state transfer message to the State Manager. The State Manager then decomposes the state transfer message, recreates the FT Transport instances (if necessary) sets the message filter id for each Transport instance, and applies the application-level state. Once the applicationlevel state and the ORB-level state are set at the recovering replica, the Recovery Manager replays the queued messages that were received after it initiated the state transfer.
Property Manager
The Property Manager stores the fault tolerance properties, such as the replication style, the fault monitoring interval, and the checkpoint interval, for each object replica in the process. It also stores the information as to whether or not the local replica is the primary.
State Manager
The State Manager implements an interface with a method that allows the application to register its factory object. This factory object must implement the FT::GenericFactory interface. The State Manager delegates the creation/deletion request from the Replication Manager to the application factory object. It keeps track of the object ids and the object references for the application objects that have been created and not yet deleted. The State Manager retrieves the applicationlevel state by invoking the get_state() method of the application objects (using the stored object references). For the set_state() method, the State Manager first creates new application objects in the recovering process using the application factory object if necessary, and then assigns the application-level state to each object by invoking the set_state() method. In addition, the State Manager is responsible for collecting the ORB-level state. Additional discussion regarding ORB-level state management is provided in section 4.
Operation Scheduler
The Operation Scheduler retrieves the request and reply messages from the respective message queues managed by the Recovery Manager. The scheduler enforces a logical singlethread of control for each replica.
Object-level fault detector
CORBA application objects that are monitored must implement the FT::PullMonitorable interface. The objectlevel fault detector uses a pool of threads to pull monitor each registered CORBA object. Based on the user-specified Fault Monitoring Interval property, the FT::PullMonitorable::is_alive() method is invoked periodically. If the invocation does not return within a specified timeout period, or if it returns CORBA::FALSE, the Fault Detector determines that the monitored object is faulty.
The object-level fault detector is, in turn, monitored by Totem, which schedules special events periodically on each node in a deterministic manner. Whenever such a special event occurs, Totem sends a fault monitoring control message to the FT protocol plug-in. The object-level fault detector responds to this control message immediately if it is alive. If the Fault Detector determines that a monitored CORBA application object is faulty, it indicates that fact in its response to the control message. If Totem receives a response with a faulty indication, or if it does not receive a response from the object-level fault detector within a specified timeout period, it shuts down the faulty process and fabricates a fault report to the Fault Notifier. Usually, one faulty object affects a number of objects in the same process. Therefore, it is practical to shutdown the entire process when a faulty object is detected.
The Fault Monitoring Granularity property, defined by the FT CORBA standard, supports hierarchical fault detection by allowing the user to select object, location or location and type as the value of that property. The location value restricts the monitoring to a particular representative object at the given location (process, processor, network, etc.), and the location and type value restricts the monitoring further to a particular representative object at the given location of the given type. Thus, regardless of the value of the Fault Monitoring Granularity, the object-level fault detector can be used.
FT protocol plug-in for unreplicated clients
The client-side fault tolerance mechanisms required by the FT CORBA standard can be implemented using the PPF for ORBs that do not yet provide such support. The architecture of the client-side FT protocol plug-in is shown in figure 4 .
The FT Adaptor makes connections and communicates directly with the primary gateway of the fault tolerance domain using TCP/IP. The FT ORB Transport component uses the interfaces provided by the Message Handler to send and receive IIOP messages. The connections to the servers are separated from the FT ORB Transport component so that it is not aware of any lost connections that occur. The Message Handler inserts a fault tolerance service context into each outgoing message and delivers incoming replies to the FT ORB Transport.
The application must register the Interoperable Object Group Reference (IOGR) of the server with the Gateway Profile Manager because the ORB itself is likely to keep only the first IIOP profile contained in the IOGR. The Failover Manager runs on a separate thread in order to heartbeat the primary gateway. If the Failover Manager determines that the primary gateway has crashed, it instructs the FT Adaptor to shutdown the current connection and to reconnect to the new primary gateway. The new primary gateway is found by cycling through the profiles in the IOGR that the Gateway Profile Manager maintains. An exception is thrown back to the application object only if all profiles in the IOGR have been tried and have failed.
Replica consistency and state synchronization
Most existing fault-tolerant CORBA infrastructures have focused on the development of mechanisms for object replication and recovery. While objects are first-class citizens in the CORBA world, they do not exist alone by themselves.
Objects are created, managed, and deleted in the scope of Portable Object Adaptors (POAs). POAs, in turn, exist in the scope of Object Request Brokers (ORBs). One or more ORBs are created and run in the scope of a process (i.e., the run-time image of an application in an operating system).
In a CORBA application, a counter is used in the scope of a POA or an ORB to assign a request identifier to each outgoing request. The corresponding reply message must carry the same request identifier. This is perhaps the most recognized ORB-level state, and can be handled by message parsing and patching by the replication mechanisms [11] . Other forms of ORB-level state have been recognized by researchers, as they have gained more experience in replicating complex CORBA applications.
In [11] it was recognized that the connection handshake, typically for codeset negotiation, can affect the ORB-level state. The connection handshake is handled by server-side message logging and replay. It is also pointed out in [10] that socket connections contribute another form of ORB-level state. However, no detailed mechanisms are given to handle the state introduced by socket connections other than the general idea of logging and transfer of connection histories. In section 4.2, we present an in-depth discussion of this issue in the context of the PluggableFT infrastructure.
In section 4.1, we discuss the implications of the CORBA's target address forwarding mechanisms and how the PluggableFT copes with them to achieve strong replica consistency.
Target address forwarding
The CORBA General Inter-ORB Protocol (GIOP) defines mechanisms that allow the client to retrieve the latest server address from its initial target.
• The reply for a request message may have a LOCA-TION_FORWARD status, where the reply body contains the latest Interoperable Reference (IOR). The IOR contains the correct target address.
• The client can issue a LocateRequest to the initial target. The corresponding LocateReply can contain OB-JECT_HERE if the initial target is capable of processing the client's request, or OBJECT_FORWARD if the target is not capable of doing that but knows the correct target address.
The target address contains both the target transport address (i.e., host and port) and the object address (i.e., object key) in the scope of the target CORBA process. If the transport address in the forwarding address that the client receives is different from that in the IOR it obtained initially, the current connection is shutdown and a new connection is set up based on the latest information. The object key may also be updated. In that case, the previous request (in case of a LOCATION_FORWARD), or the next message (in case of an OBJECT_FORWARD), is sent through the existing connection. Receiving a reply with a LOCATION_FORWARD causes the client ORB to resend the same request message through the existing or a new connection. In effect, there is an additional round of message passing for the request. The use of the LocateRequest/LocateReply for each new connection introduces an extra round of message passing with respect to the normal application remote invocation.
The presence of the additional round of message passing can prevent new replicas from being added to the group, and failed replicas from being recovered. The reason is that the reply message that corresponds to the extra request message might have already been sent by the time a new or restarted replica is added to the group. As a result, the extra request message sent by the recovering replica is suppressed at the remote site because it is deemed to be a duplicate, and the recovering replica must wait until it receives the reply.
Therefore, it is necessary to log the corresponding reply for the extra request message. To cope with Target Address Forwarding (TAF), the replication mechanisms maintain a TAF log to store the TAF reply messages (i.e., LocateReply message and reply messages that contain a LOCA-TION_FORWARD status). The algorithm that is executed on receiving a reply and on sending a request is shown in algorithm 1. The TAF Message Log is part of the ORB-level state and is transferred from the existing replica to the recovering replica.
Dynamic connections
In simple applications, where all of the connections, once setup, are never torn-down during the applications' lifetime, the connection-related state can be reconstructed at the recovering replica and, therefore, no explicit state transfer of connection-related state is necessary. However, complex applications often use dynamic connections, i.e., the connection's lifetime is much shorter than that of the applications. The presence of dynamic connections raises a number of interesting challenges for consistent replication and recovery of CORBA application objects. As mentioned in section 3.1.2, the mechanisms associate the current counter value with each connection that the local replica has initiated and incremented. On the server side, a matching connection sequence number is used for the connection.
However, the connection sequence number alone cannot prevent duplicate messages from being suppressed at the server side if the client-side replicas are not completely synchronized, as shown in figure 5 . All server-side connection history must be preserved after a connection is torn-down. On receiving a connection indication request, the mechanisms on the server-side check the connection history log. A new connection is setup as requested only if there is no record in the log.
Aside from duplicate detection, the presence of dynamic connections introduces additional ORB-level state that must be properly transferred from the existing replicas to a new or restarted replica. This is particularly important for multi-tier applications. Inconsistent connection state in a replica in the middle-tier can cause duplicate messages to be delivered, or non-duplicate messages to be dropped at the back-end tier. An example is shown in figure 6 . If only the state of the counter for client-side connection creation is transferred to the new replica, the three client-side connections that are created after recovery (at the time the first nested request is issued for each connection) to the back-end tier would use 9-11 as the connection sequence number without knowing that 2, 5, 8 should actually be used for the corresponding logical connections. If the new replica sends a duplicate nested request to the back-end tier, the mechanisms at the back-end tier will set up a connection and deliver the duplicate request to the backend replicas, thus violating strong replica consistency. On the other hand, if none of the counter and connection information is transferred to the new replica, the three connections created after the recovery will carry connection sequence numbers of 0, 1 and 2 (as shown in figure 6 ). If a non-duplicate nested request is sent through any of the connections, the message will be dropped at the back-end tier because the corresponding server-side connection is not created, because of the duplicate detection mechanisms (connections with such sequence numbers are created and subsequently torn down).
One of the benefits of incorporating the fault tolerance mechanisms into the ORB is to capture and restore the connection state. In PluggableFT, all of the connection history and the current active connection information at the existing replica are collected and transferred to the recovering replica. At the recovering replica, all of the transport instances for the active connections at the existing replica are pre-allocated and contain the most up-to-date information. All of the server-side transports are handed over to the acceptor instance. When the ORB initiates a client connection, it examines the pre-allocated client-side transports. If the ORB finds a client-side transport, it returns that transport to the connector; otherwise, it creates a new client-side transport.
Optimization and practical considerations
In this section, we discuss a number of issues that are related to the performance and robustness of the fault-tolerant system. These issues either are largely ignored, or have not been effectively addressed, by other general-purpose fault-tolerant CORBA frameworks.
While it has long been recognized that duplicate detection and suppression is essential for any fault tolerance system, few studies have paid attention to its impact on system performance. In Section 5.1, we describe a smart duplicate detection and suppression mechanism that can significantly improve the end-to-end latency of replicated applications.
In section 5.2, we discuss issues related to the synchronization of fault-free operations performed by replicas of the same group. We point out why such intra-group synchronization is necessary for general-purpose fault tolerance systems and describe further the mechanisms employed by PluggableFT to achieve such synchronization.
Smart duplicate detection
Duplicate detection and suppression is a common problem in all fault-tolerant systems. In some systems, such as Delta-4 [17] , an intra-group communication system is used to guarantee that no duplicates are sent by a replica group. However, such mechanisms involve additional message-passing and, therefore, are expensive to use. In Eternal [10] , duplicate detection is carried out at both the source and the destination with no additional intra-group communication. A concept of operation identifiers is introduced in Eternal to facilitate duplicate detection. Duplicate detection and suppression in PluggableFT follows the same approach, but with further enhancements on the sending-side.
The sending of duplicate messages over the network does not compromise a fault-tolerance infrastructure's integrity as long as those messages are suppressed at the destination. However, the presence of duplicate messages in the network degrades the throughput and end-to-end latency [22] . The adverse effects are more severe if the messages are large and/or the replication degree is high.
In PluggableFT, the sending-side duplicate detection and suppression is carried out by a two-tier duplicate filtering mechanism. A top-level duplicate filter is located in the replication mechanisms that are pluggable into the ORB. A bottom-level duplicate filter is located in the process group layer in Totem. The two-tier duplicate filtering mechanisms can successfully suppress duplicate messages that are smaller than Totem's flow-control window size.
Top-tier duplicate filter
In PluggableFT, all messages are multicast across the fault tolerance domain so that a replica can receive the messages sent by its peer replicas in the same group. The top-tier duplicate filter exploits this fact to detect and suppress the sending of a duplicate message from the local replica. The duplicate filter maintains a table of the most recent operation identifiers for the messages sent by the peer replicas, one for each connection. The record for an old message is removed as soon as a new message for the same connection is received. Before sending a message, the mechanisms compare the operation identifier of the message and the records in the duplicate filter table. If an operation identifier with the same connection identifier, but with an equal or greater than message sequence number, the message is deemed to be a duplicate and is suppressed. An illustration of the top-tier duplicate filter is shown in figure 7 . This scheme works best when the replicas process the same request at sufficently different times, which is the case when the load on the replicas is high.
Under light loads, the top-tier duplicate filtering is ineffective because all of the replicas write the reply or nested request into Totem's send buffer at about the same time. As a result, almost all duplicate messages are multicast over the network, which results in longer end-to-end latencies seen by the clients and other applications running in the same fault tolerance domain.
Bottom-tier duplicate filter
The bottom-tier duplicate filter maintains an intermediate send buffer for outgoing messages sent by the replicas running on the same node, as shown in figure 8 . The messages stored in the intermediate buffer will eventually be multicast to the network when the token arrives. The use of the intermediate buffer provides a better chance for sending-side duplicate suppression because messages sent by peer replicas in the same group have a better chance of being received before the token arrives. The operation identifier of a received message is compared with the operation identifiers of the queued messages. If a match is found, the particular queued message must be a duplicate and, therefore, is deleted from the intermediate send buffer and is discarded.
If the message size exceeds the Totem window size for sending in a single token visit as governed by the Totem flow control mechanisms, the bottom-tier duplicate filter mechanism is not effective. The reason is that, during the first round of the token visit, all duplicate messages are passed to Totem for multicast. None of the nodes can possibly receive such a multicast message during the round. In a later round, when Totem at the most favorable node finishes sending the complete message, other nodes can receive the message before they finish sending the same message. However, by then it is too late to stop sending the rest of the packets for large messages.
Intra-group replica synchronization
Under heavy load, and/or deployment of replicas on nonhomogeneous computers that have different processor speeds and RAM sizes, the processing at different replicas in the same group must be synchronized to the extent that the input buffers of the replicas allow. The reason is that the clients' requests arrive at the replicas according to the processing speed of the fastest replica in the group. The incoming requests are queued in the input buffers of the slower replicas. The queued messages will eventually overflow the buffers, and will result in the slower replicas crashing. For the same reason, it might not be possible to restart or add new replicas. The replicas in a group might be transiently de-synchronized even if they run on identical hardware as a result of jitter in processing, scheduling, or other CPU-intensive applications. If this desynchronization period is long enough, it can result in the input buffer overflow at the slower replicas.
In synchronous fault-tolerant systems, such as MARS [5] , Delta-4 [17] and SIFT [20] , the processing of each input is closely synchronized, either using deterministic scheduling, or some form of intra-group communication. Most generalpurpose fault-tolerant systems do not address this issue, despite the fact that intra-group replica synchronization is important for providing robust fault tolerance. In PluggableFT, we relax the intra-group replica synchronization from a per request basis to a constraint imposed by the size of the input buffers of the replication mechanisms at the replicas. The synchronization mechanism is activated in a lazy manner to achieve the best performance and is most suitable for handling the transient de-synchronization problem.
Data structures
The algorithm uses an intra-group synchronization request control message, called INTRA_GRP_SYNC to inform the fastest replica to slow down. This message carries the common FT protocol header, and the slowest replica's backlog value in its payload. The algorithm employs the following constants for each replica. They are the same for all replicas in a group:
• InputBufferSize: The size of the buffer used by the replication mechanisms (inside the ORB) to queue incoming messages (requests and replies).
• LW: Low Watermark. The bottom limit of the backlog, which should be set to a small percentage of the input buffer size.
• HW: High Watermark. The top limit of the backlog, which should be set to a moderately high percentage of the input buffer size.
• DW: Danger Watermark. A limit that is very close to the input buffer size. It is regarded as extremely dangerous if the backlog size exceeds the danger watermark; immediate action must be taken when that happens.
• DU: Minimum Delay Unit. The unit of the delay applied for each message delivered to the local replica.
The algorithm also maintains the following local variables for each replica.
• myBacklog: The space of the input buffer that has been taken by the queued messages.
• peerBacklog: The backlog size in the INTRA_GRP_ SYNC message sent by the slowest replica.
• myDelay: The actual delay that should be applied before delivering a message to the local replica.
• stopDeliveringMsg: A flag such that, when set, the algorithm will stop delivering messages to the local replica.
The choice of values of the three watermarks must consider the number of different clients. In particular, the danger watermark must be smaller than the difference between the input buffer size and the number of concurrent clients. The reason is that requests from clients can arrive concurrently and can cause an overflow of the input buffer if the danger watermark is closer to the input buffer limit than the number of concurrent clients. The high watermark should be slightly smaller than the danger watermark, and the low watermark should be slightly larger than the number of concurrent clients. 
Intra-group replica synchronization algorithm
The intra-group synchronization algorithm is shown in algorithm 2: during initialization, the stopDeliver ingMsg flag is set to false, and the myDelay variable is set to zero (lines 1-2 in algorithm 2).
For each new user message received, the current backlog is compared with the high watermark. If the backlog is greater than the high watermark, an INTRA_GRP_SYNC message, with the current backlog as payload, is sent to the group. Then, the incoming user message is queued in the input buffer (lines 3-8 in algorithm 2).
For each INTRA_GRP_SYNC message received, the peer backlog is retrieved and stored in peerBacklog. If the local backlog is still less than the low watermark, the delivery delay is incremented by the minimum delay. If the backlog of the replica that issued the INTRA_GRP_SYNC message exceeds the danger watermark, the stopDeliveringMsg flag is set. If the local backlog is already higher than the low watermark, no action is taken (lines 9-15 in algorithm 2).
Lines 16-23 in algorithm 2 give the rule for delivering a message to the local replica. On delivering a new message in the input buffer to the local replica, if the current backlog is less than the low watermark, the stopDeliveringMsg flag is checked. If the flag is set, the message is returned to the input buffer instead of being delivered. If the flag is not set, the mechanisms suspend execution for a short period of time based on the delay before the message is delivered. In effect, the replica is slowed down. If the current backlog exceeds the low watermark, the stopDeliveringMsg flag is unset if it is still set and the message is delivered without suspending execution.
When the slowest replica leaves the object group, the algorithm resets stopDeliveringMsg to false and myDelay to zero (not shown in algorithm 5.2.1).
Discussion
The mechanisms at the slowest replica exert pressure on the faster replicas to slow down by repeatedly sending the IN-TRA_GRP_SYNC message. The suspension period at the faster replicas increases linearly with the reception of each INTRA_GRP_SYNC message. The minimum delay must be selected according to the difference in speed between the fastest and the slowest replicas. Too large a value can slow down the faster replicas quickly but it might not be able to achieve a dynamic balance among the replicas. Too small a value can force the slowest replica to send many INTRA_GRP_SYNC messages and the backlog at the slowest replica can exceed the danger watermark. Eventually, it can cause a long end-to-end latency as seen by the client while the faster replicas are waiting for the slowest replica to flush its input buffer. Exponential increase and backoff of the suspension period can be used to achieve fast synchronization.
Performance
We have implemented the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure using ORBacus 4.0.4 [16] and e * ORB 2.1 [19] and the C++ programming language. In this paper we provide experimental results for the pluggable protocol infrastructure for e * ORB.
The experiments were performed on six Pentium III PCs over a 100 Mbps local-area network. Each PC is equipped with a 1 GHz CPU, 256 MB of RAM and runs the Mandrake Linux 7.2 operating system.
A simple client/server application was developed for the experiments. The server contains a method that takes a sequence of octet and returns an identical sequence of octet to the client, so that the request message is similar in length to the reply message, thus reflecting the round-trip nature of the messages.
For the active and semi-active replication styles, we focused on two performance metrics: (1) runtime overhead, and (2) fault detection and recovery time. We measured the runtime overhead as a function of payload length and replication degree. We measured the fault detection time for each process crash fault, the recovery time of loading a new replica, as a function of state size, and the recovery time of the primary replica fault for semi-active replication. Note that the smart duplicate filtering mechanism is turned off in the experiment (for active replication) to show the effect of the duplicate messages on the system performance.
Latency
For the overhead measurements, we ran one or more unreplicated clients on one PC and replicated servers on the other PCs, each on a distinct PC. The average latency for two-way invocations was measured at the client-side.
Message length dependency
The FT protocol plug-in is layered underneath the GIOP messaging protocol and, therefore, does not parse or interpret the GIOP message body. Consequently, the overhead of the FT protocol depends on the lengths of messages, rather than on the complexity of the data types and the signatures of the remote methods. Figure 9 shows the average latency for synchronous remote invocations with various payloads for a three-way replicated server using both active and semi-active replication, and also for the unreplicated client/server case.
The overhead of the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure is due primarily to the following aspects of active replication: Figure 9 . Round-trip latency as a function of payload length.
• The Totem reliable totally-ordered multicast protocol involves significant CPU usage (+10%) and takes additional network bandwidth. In our experimental configuration, the network bandwidth taken by the rotating token of Totem is about 4 Mbps.
• With active replication on identical processors, unless a smart duplicate filtering mechanism is used, such as the one described in this paper, most of the duplicate messages show up in the network, wasting processing power and network bandwidth.
As figure 9 shows, semi-active replication exhibits a significant performance gain over active replication, particularly for large messages, without effective duplicate suppression. Figure 10 shows the round-trip latencies for two different payload sizes as a function of replication degree for active and semi-active replication.
Replication degree dependency
The Totem single-ring protocol uses a rotating token around a logical ring to order messages [8] . The ring size (i.e., the number of processors running Totem) increases with the degree of replication, given that the replicas run on different processors. Therefore, as the degree of replication increases, the latency overhead increases because (1) the token rotation time increases, (2) the collective processing time at the node increases, and (3) for active replication, the number of duplicate messages in the network that need to be delivered reliably and in order increases.
As figure 10 shows, by eliminating the duplicate messages in the network, the latency is reduced significantly for semiactive replication compared to active replication, especially for invocations with large payload and for a high degree of replication.
Fault detection and recovery
We also measured the time for Totem to detect a process crash fault. In the experiment Totem records a start time before it sends a kill signal to the process, and an end time when it receives the notification regarding the lost socket event from its reactor. The process crash fault detection time is the difference between the end time and the start time. On average, the process crash fault detection time is about 3 ms. Next we measured the recovery time for adding a new replica into an existing group. To obtain a clear picture of the cost of recovery at various stages, we measured the recovery time using the following metrics:
Application Recovery Time. The time interval between the start of the application replica as indicated by the start of the main() routine and the completion of the set_ state() method invocation. This time is closest to the recovery time as perceived by the end user (only the time spent in loading the application is not counted). It includes the initialization cost of the ORB and the application. Totem Recovery Time. The time interval between detecting the join of a new replica and finishing the writing of the SET_STATE protocol message to the replica (the reply of the set_state() invocation is not written to Totem). This time best reflects the actual cost of the fault-tolerant infrastructure for application recovery. It does not include the initialization cost of the ORB or the application. SET_STATE Transmission Time. The time interval between receiving the GET_STATE protocol message and completing the set_state() method invocation (of the application object), measured at the application process. Assuming that the existing replicas and the newly started replica receive the GET_STATE protocol message at about the same time, this time reflects approximately the cost of retrieving and setting the application-level, ORB-level and infrastructure-level state, and the transmission and delivery time of the SET_STATE message. In our experiments, the cost of retrieving and setting the different levels of state is negligible; therefore, the cost of transmitting the SET_STATE message dominates.
The results of the recovery time measurements are shown in figure 11 . As expected, the recovery time using the application recovery time metric is significantly larger than the time measured using the other two metrics. The recovery times using the second and the third metrics show a linear dependency on the application state size. For an application with a state as large as 100 KB (where the ORB-level and the infrastructurelevel state is negligible compared with the application-level state), the recovery time is about 100 ms, 40 ms and 10 ms, using the three metrics, respectively.
The time needed to recover from the failure of the primary replica for semi-active replication is also measured. To avoid the need for clock synchronization, both the primary replica and a secondary replica (to be promoted to primary) are run on the same processor. We send a kill signal to the primary replica; the primary replica then records a time and exits. Totem detects the loss of the primary replica and promotes the secondary replica to be the new primary replica. The FT plugin records the time when the secondary replica is promoted. The difference between the two recorded times is regarded as the recovery time from the primary replica fault. This recovery time increases with the replication degree and the Totem ring size. In the case of four processors, the recovery time is approximately 10 ms.
Related work
Three Fault-Tolerant CORBA systems that implement all or part of the FT CORBA standard are DOORS [13] , Eternal [9, 10, 12] and IRL [7] . All three systems use a nonintrusive approach. On top of an interception-based faulttolerance infrastructure, Eternal implements the Replication Manager, the Fault Detector and the Fault Notifier as CORBA objects to provide services to application objects. By using CORBA's portable interceptors, IRL embeds a set of CORBA objects that implement mechanisms for transparent reinvocation and redirection, and for duplicate detection and suppression, in the application address space.
Although the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure bears some similarities to the interception approach used by Eternal, in that messages are routed through a group communication system, it is more similar to the integration approach because the fault tolerance mechanisms are embedded inside the ORB. Of course, some management components (the Replication Manager and the Fault Notifier) are implemented as CORBA services, which the FT CORBA standard requires.
Embedding the fault tolerance mechanisms into the ORB facilitates the transfer of ORB-level state, as well as application-level state, in an accurate and efficient manner. This approach also provides the opportunity for improved quality of service for the applications by allowing different protocols to be plugged into the ORB. To retrieve and assign the ORBlevel state properly, the interception-based and service-based FT CORBA systems involve ad-hoc interfaces from the ORB vendors.
Nevertheless, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure differs from the integration-based systems in several respects:
• The Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure enters the ORB address space by using the PPF provided by the ORB, with no modification to the ORB core. The integration-based systems require extensive modifications to the ORB to accommodate the fault tolerance mechanisms.
• Because the PPFs offered by the ORBs follow similar object-oriented design patterns, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure can be easily ported from one ORB to another, whereas integration-based systems are tightly integrated into a particular ORB.
• The Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure requires only minimal modification to the application programs for loading the FT protocol plug-in if the PPF (e.g., e * ORB or ORBacus 4.0) allows the user to select the particular protocol by invoking an API within main(), or no modification at all (other than those required by the FT CORBA specification) if the PPF (e.g., ORBacus 4.1) allows the ORB to load the particular protocol at runtime. Like the interception and service-based approaches, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure provides fault tolerance to applications in a transparent manner, while the applications running on integration-based systems implement fault tolerance directly using their own interfaces.
A performance comparison between the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure and other Fault-Tolerant CORBA systems is difficult because of the configuration differences for the measurements and/or the lack of data for those systems. Because a well-engineered group communication system, such as Totem, has better performance than multiple pointto-point TCP/IP communications for the same group size, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure can outperform existing service-based Fault-Tolerant CORBA systems in terms of run-time overhead. Moreover, the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure, based on Totem, achieves similar or better performance than the interception-based Eternal system [23] .
Semi-active replication was introduced in Delta-4 [17] , and has since been used in several other systems [1, 2] . These systems differ from the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure in that they use semi-active replication to handle nondeterminism along with application semantics, rather than to improve performance. By using semi-active replication, fault-tolerant systems can achieve good performance by preventing duplicate messages from reaching the network. To achieve similar performance using active replication, a sophisticated sending-side duplicate filtering mechanism must be used. Semi-active replication also provides faster recovery from faults than passive replication.
Conclusion
We have described the design, implementation and performance of the Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure, a faulttolerant CORBA system based on the pluggable protocols framework that most CORBA ORBs now provide. Applications can achieve higher reliability and availability by plugging in the FT protocol with minimal modifications to their existing code. The Pluggable FT CORBA Infrastructure has the advantages of both the intrusive (integration-based) and non-intrusive (serviced-based and interception-based) systems, while overcoming the drawbacks of each.
